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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J. R. BAGNALL, aka JOSEPH ) 
BAGNALL, and FLORENCE BAGNALL, 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
vs. 
SUBURBIA LAND COMPANY, an 
Idaho corporation, et al., 
'-. Defendants and 
Counter-Appel-
lants. 
Case No. 13,753 
REPLY TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
Appellants, Suburbia Land Company, et al., seek a rehearing 
of the decision rendered by this Court on October 31, 1975, 
wherein this Court affirmed the decision of the trial court which 
granted judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants 
forfeiting the real estate agreement and quieting title in the 
plaintiffs, except for an undivided one-half interest in 140.15 
acres, which the Court, by Summary Judgment and Decree of Quiet 
Title awarded to the defendant, United Paint and Color. Plain-
tiffs1 appeal from the Summary Judgment is presently pending 
before this Court. 
POINT I 
LONG STANDING PRECEDENT AND SOUND POLICY DICTATE THAT A RE-
HEARING SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF REARGUING THE. 
SAME QUESTIONS THAT WERE BRIEFED AND ARGUED ON APPEAL. 
It is a well settled rule that a rehearing under Rule 76(e) (1), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, should not be granted merely for Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
purposes of rearguing matters that already have been briefed and 
argued to the Court. Such a policy was clearly enunciated by 
this Court as early as 1886 in Ducheneau v. House, 4 Utah 483, 11 
P. 618, and Jones v. House, 4 Utah 484, 11 P. 619. The reasons 
for this rule are clearly set forth in Cummings v. Nielson, 42 
Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1912) at 624, wherein the Court states: 
In this case nothing was done or attempted by 
counsel, except to reargue the very proposi-
tions we had fully considered and decided. If 
we should write opinions on all the petitions 
for rehearing filed, we would have to devote a 
very large portion of our time in answering 
counsel's contentions a second time; and, if 
we should grant rehearings because they are 
demanded, we should do nothing else save to 
write and rewrite opinions in a few cases. 
All litigation must have an end. Unless there is obvious error, 
and not merely a petitioner's disagreement or disatisfaction with 
the Court's opinion, rehearings are not to be granted. Virtually 
all of the courts in this country strictly follow such a rule. 
See, e.g., Climate Control, Inc. v. Hill, 87 Ariz. 201, 349 P.2d 
771 (1960); Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Ludwig, 158 Kan. 275,. 
146 P.2d 656 (1944); Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co., 55 N.M. 81, 
227 P.2d 365 (1950). See also 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error, §988. 
Appellants' raise six factual questions in Point III of their 
petition, claiming that these six issues "are basically matters 
of law applied to uncontroverted fact." The writer will not 
attack each of these issues in this brief, for this has already 
been done in Points I-VI of respondents' appellate brief. Suffice 
it to say that the petitioners' contention that these six points 
are questions of "lav; as applied to uncontroverted fact" is 
totally without merit. All six propositions are grounded almost. 
entirely in factual questions that are heatedly disputed by all Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
sides. These disputations of fact have already been fully briefed 
and argued to this Court; the total number of pages in the briefs 
of both sides covering these six propositions is in excess of 
seventy pages. Petitioners1 bring forth no controlling case law 
heretofore overlooked, nor any newly discovered evidence not 
available until the present; they simply are asking the court to 
indulge them in a reargument of their previously asserted conten-
tions. Such is not grounds for a rehearing. 
Point IV of petitioners1 brief, while a matter of procedure 
and not a question of fact, has also been fully briefed and 
argued by both sides, and nothing new has been offered for the 
consideration of this court. Point IV of appellants1 petition, 
like their Point III discussed above, is merely a request to 
reargue a question that the court has already heard and passed 
upon. 
Petitioners1 contentions, in Points I and II of their brief, 
that the Court did not carefully consider the state of the record 
on appeal and the resulting unreferenced self-serving statements, 
is completely without substance. The appellants1 chose to selec-
tively designate only those portions of the trial transcript and 
exhibits which were favorable to their position on appeal. The 
sorry state of the record, and the unreferenced self-serving 
statements, were closely scrutinized by the Court, and became the 
basis of the Courts written de cision. The Court, in its opinion, 
stated: 
As a result we have before us briefs of 
both sides loaded with unreferenced, self-serv-
ing statements of facts and contentions, with 
an apparent invitation that we perform their 
procedural obligations and conduct their re-
search. We cannot indulge them such luxury 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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under the circumstances here. This court, 
therefore, under elementary principles anent 
appellate review, in this particular case will 
presume the findings of the court to have 
been supported by admissible, competent, sub-
stantial evidence - to any cirticism of which, 
by any litigants, the court feels constrained 
to turn a deafened ear. 
Respondents' appellate brief includes several pages showing 
which relevant and necessary parts of the record were selectively 
ignored by the appellants, including the direct and re-direct 
examination of J. R. Bagnall, the direct examination of Don V. 
Tibbs and all of the cross-examination of Reed R. Maxfield. (See 
respondents' brief Point X for further elaboration on this point). 
But this is not the time nor the place to reargue these points, 
as this was fully done on appeal; and the serious consideration 
which the Court gave to these arguments, as evidenced by the 
above quotation from its opinion, precludes the necessity of 
rearguing the same points once again. 
Appellants' brief and petition for rehearing is merely a re-
argument of the propositions breifed and argued on appeal, and, 
therefore, the petition should be denied. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN BASING ITS DECISION ON THE PRESUMP-
TION THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WERE SUPPORTED BY AD-
MISSIBLE, COMPETENT AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The appellants1 failure to designate all relevant and neces-
sary parts of the record further resulted in the Court's decision 
to "presume the findings of the [trial] court to have been 
supported by admissible, competent, substantial evidence. . . ." 
Appellents1 burden on appeal was to show that the findings and 
conclusions of the trial court were in error. Since the actions 
- 4 - • 
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of the trial court are clothed with a presumption of validity, 
an appellate court should reverse the decision of the trial court 
only if the evidence clearly perponderates against the trial 
court's findings and judgment. 
To sustain the burden of showing that the trial court's 
decision was in error, appellants are required to bring all the 
evidence relating to issues on appeal before the court, thus 
allowing the court to determine the weight and validity of the 
evidence presented at trial. This Court has repeatedly stated 
that failure to designate all of the pertinent record will result 
in a presumption that the evidence at trial was sufficient to 
support the verdict. James Manufacturing Company v. Wilson, 15 
U.2d 210, 390 P.2d 127 (1964); Owyhee, Inc. v. Robbins Marco Polo, 
17 U.2d 181, 407 P.2d 565 (1965); Bennett Leasing Company v. 
Ellison, 15 U.2d 72, 387 P.2d 246 (1963). The majority of courts 
in other jurisdictions follow this rule. 4 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal 
and Error, §526. The appellants, by failing to designate all of 
the necessary and pertinent parts of the record, cannot sustain 
the burden of showing that the trial court erred in its findings 
and judgment. As a result, this court properly presumed the 
trial court's finding to be supported by competent, admissible 
evidence, and the trial court's judgment was properly affirmed. 
Finally, in Point V of petitioners' brief, they claim as a 
basis for rehearing, a right to have a written response to each 
of their contentions. As explained above, the Court considered 
all of the appellants' arguments, affirmed and adopted the trial 
court's findings, and wrote its decision based thereon. Thus, 
the findings of the trial court became the findings of the appel-
-5-
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late court, and became the basis of the Court's written decision. 
This is the written answer that appellants are entitled to. This 
Court has written the answer once, and need not do it twice. 
In any event, nothing in petitioners1 Point V can be consid-
ered "new" or "obvious error" so that a rehearing should result, 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents respectfully submit that the Court should deny 
the Petition for Rehearing. 
1
 DATED at Provo, Utah, this 2nd day of February, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Respondents 
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